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Abstract
Intermediate states are known from intercept/resend eavesdropping in the
BB84 quantum cryptographic protocol. But they also play fundamental roles
in the optimal eavesdropping strategy on BB84 and in the CHSH inequality.
We generalize the intermediate states to arbitrary dimension and consider in-
tercept/resend eavesdropping, optimal eavesdropping on the generalized BB84
protocol and present a generalized CHSH inequality for two entangled quNits
based on these states.
1 Introduction
The quantum cryptographic protocol, known as the BB84 [1], was originally
developed for qubits. In this protocol the legitimate users, Alice and Bob, both
use the same two mutually unbiased bases A and A′. Alice use them for state
preparation1 and Bob chooses between the two bases for his measurement. But
an eavesdropper performing the simple intercept/resend eavesdropping, may
chose to measure in what is known as the intermediate basis or the Breidbart
basis [2]. In the case of qubits it is possible to form four intermediate states,
which falls into two mutually unbiased bases. However the eavesdropper need
only use one of these bases.
It turns out that it is not only in the simple intercept/resend eavesdropping
that these intermediate states appear. Also in the optimal eavesdropping
strategy [3, 4], which consists of the eavesdropper using the optimal cloning
machine, these states enters. In this case, they appear at the point where
Bob and the eavesdropper, Eve, have the same amount of information, i.e.
where their information lines cross. At this point their mixed states may be
decomposed into a mixture of some of the intermediate states.
That the intermediate states also appear in the optimal eavesdropping
strategy, also explains a curious observation. Namely, that the amount of
1Notice that Alice may use a maximally entangled state of two qubits for preparing the state
she sends to Bob, since a measurement on one qubit will ’prepare’ the state of the other qubit.
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information obtained by the eavesdropper at the crossing point between the
information lines using optimal eavesdropping, and the amount of information
she obtains performing intercept/resend eavesdropping in the intermediate
basis, is the same. However, the error rates are quite different.
Further more intermediate states reappear in the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-
Holt (CHSH) inequality [5] for two entangled qubits. Where the maximal
violation is obtained when on the first qubit the measurement settings cor-
respond to the two mutually unbiased bases A and A′, and on the second
qubit the two intermediate bases. Moreover when introducing the same kind
of noise as the eavesdropper does in the optimal eavesdropping strategy, the
Bell violation naturally decreases. But it is interesting to notice that for the
critical disturbance where the classical limit is reached, Bob and Eve have
the same amount of information, i.e. this happens at the crossing point of
the information lines. This crossing point between the two information lines
is a very important point, since upto this limit Alice and Bob can use the
fact that they have more mutual information than the eavesdropper and they
can create a secure key just by using classical error correction and one-way
privacy amplification. Hence the CHSH inequality for qubits can be used as
a security measure [6, 7].
In the three situation just described, intercept/resend eavesdropping, op-
timal eavesdropping and the CHSH-inequality, the intermediate states keep
reappearing and seem to play a fundamental role.
A natural question to ask is ’what happens in higher dimensions?’. This
is the question we try to answer, at least partially, here. It is possible to
generalize the BB84 protocol to arbitrary dimension [8, 9, 10, 3, 4], simply
by adding basis vectors to the two mutually unbiased bases, so that for N
dimension each basis contain N vectors. The intermediate states may also be
generalized to arbitrary dimensions. However, in higher dimensions they do in
general not form bases. But it is possible to associate with each intermediate
state a projector, which represents a binary measurement.
With the use of these generalized intermediate states we investigate inter-
cept/resend eavesdropping, optimal eavesdropping and a generalized CHSH
inequality in arbitrary dimension to see if they play the same role as in two
dimension.
In section 2 we introduce the intermediate states for quNits. In section 3 we
shortly discuss intercept/resend eavesdropping using the intermediate states.
In section 4 we compare optimal eavesdropping with the intercept/resend
eavesdropping strategy. Then in section 5 we present a generalized Bell in-
equality for two entangled quNits. In section 6 we consider the Bell violation
as a function of the disturbance the optimal eavesdropping strategy would
lead to. The last sections of the paper is devoted to a study of the inequality
we have presented. In section 7 we discuss some features of the inequality
by giving examples in three dimensions. Since recently the strength of a Bell
inequality has been measured in terms of its resistance to noise we discuss
this issue in section 8. Section 9 is devoted to a brief study of the required
detection efficiency. Finally in section 10 we have conclusion and discussion.
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2 The intermediate states
The quantum cryptographic protocol BB84 can easily be generalized to arbi-
trary dimension, this has already been discussed in the literature [8, 10]. The
protocol works in exactly the same way as for qubits with the sole exception
that for quNits each of the two mutually unbiased bases A and A′ used by
Alice and Bob contain N basis states instead of two. So that Alice sends at
random (and with equal probability) one of the 2N possible states and Bob
choses to measure in one of the two bases A and A′.
In this section we define the intermediate states between these two bases.
The basis A is chosen as the computational basis,
| a0 〉, · · · , | aN−1 〉, (1)
and the second basis, A′, is the Fourier transform of the computational basis:
| a′k 〉 =
1√
N
N−1∑
n=0
exp (
2pii kn
N
) | an 〉 (2)
These two bases are mutually unbiased, i.e.
〈 an | a′k 〉 =
exp ( 2pii kn
N
)√
N
(3)
This means that the distance between pairs of state from the two bases is
cos(θ) = 1/
√
N .
Having two states, it is possible to define a state which lies exactly in
between the two, which means that it has the same overlap with both states
and it is the state closest to the two original states which has this property.
The intermediate state are obtained by forming all possible pairs of the states
from the two bases. They are shown in the table below:
a′0 a′1 · · · a′N−1
a0 m00 m01 · m0,N−1
a1 m10 m11 · m1,N−1
... · · · ·
aN−1 mN−1,0 mN−1,1 · mN−1,N−1
Explicitly the intermediate state between | an 〉 and | a′k 〉 is defined in the
following way
|mnk 〉 = 1√
C
[
exp
(
2pii kn
N
)
| an 〉+ | a′k 〉
]
(4)
where C = 2(1 + 1/
√
N) is the normalization constant and the phase comes
from the overlap between | an 〉 and | a′k 〉, see eq.(3). The index of the m-
states are such that the first index always refers to the A and the second to
the A′-basis. Since each basis contains N states it is possible to form N2
intermediate states, simply by forming all pairs of states from the two bases.
3
In general the intermediate state |mαβ 〉 between two arbitrary initial
states |α 〉 and |β 〉 is defined as
|mαβ 〉 =
√〈α |β 〉|α 〉+√〈β |α 〉|β 〉√
2
√|〈α |β 〉|+ |〈α |β 〉|2 (5)
The intermediate states may be defined in complete generality for arbitrary
initial states and any number of them. In this case the intermediate state is
found by forming the mixture of all the initial states with equal weight, the
eigenstate state with the largest eigenvalue of this mixture corresponds to the
intermediate state. Naturally these definitions are equivalent and lead to the
same intermediate state.
Considering the intermediate states leads to the following conditional prob-
abilities
p(mnk|an) = p(mnk|a′k) =
1 + 1√
N
2
≡ F (6)
Notice that this definition indeed recover the formula for cosine of half the
angle: cos(θ/2) =
√
1+cos(θ)
2 . This is why the states have been named inter-
mediate states, since they indeed lie in between the the two original states.
Whereas the probability for making an error is
p(mnk|aq) = p(mnk|a′p) =
1− 1√
N
2(N − 1) ≡
D
N − 1 (7)
It is important to notice that the intermediates states in general not are
orthogonal, indeed
〈mkl |mnm 〉 = 1√
NC
[√
Nδkn exp
(
2pii
N
(mn− lk)
)
+
√
Nδlm + exp
(
2pii
N
(m− l)k
)
+ exp
(
2pii
N
(m− l)n
)]
(8)
This means that the generalized intermediate states do in general not form
bases as in the two dimensional case. But they can still be used as binary
measurements, this is discussed in the next section.
2.1 Intermediate states as binary measurements
It has just been shown that in general the intermediate states |mkl 〉 are not
orthogonal, and hence they do not form bases as in the two dimensional case.
It is however possible to use the corresponding projectors, |mkl 〉〈mkl | as
binary measurements.
Since the intermediate states are non-orthogonal, it means that the cor-
responding binary measurements are mutually incompatible. In other words,
none of them can be measured together but they have to be measured one
by one. A binary measurement, has as the name indicates two possible out-
comes, 0 and 1. Where the zero outcome is interpreted as ’I guess the state
was not |mkl 〉’, and the ’1’ outcome is interpreted as ’I guess the state was
|mkl 〉’. However, the answers are statistical, in the sense that there is a
certain probability for making the wrong identification.
4
It should be mentioned that the N2 intermediate states constitutes a gen-
eralized measurement namely a so called POVM. We have
N−1∑
n,k=0
1
N
|mnk 〉〈mnk | = 1 (9)
However, we do not make use of this in what follows.
3 Intercept/resend eavesdropping
Suppose that the eavesdropper, Eve, performs the simple intercept/resend
eavesdropping. This means that she intercepts the particle send by Alice,
performs a measurement and according to the result prepares a particle which
she then sends to Bob. She may choose to measure in the same bases as Alice
and Bob, but she may also choose to use the intermediate states. In higher
dimensions where the intermediate states do not form bases, this strategy
becomes a bit artificial. It is nevertheless interesting to consider it briefly.
In arbitrary dimension where the intermediate states corresponds to binary
measurements, the intercept/resend strategy using these measurements may
look like this: When ever Eve obtains a ’1’, which means she can make a good
guess of the state, she prepares a new state and sends it to Bob. Whereas in
the cases where she gets a ’0’, which means she is unable to make a good guess,
she does not send anything to Bob. In this way we are only considering the
cases where Eve does obtain a useful answer. This strategy, of course, gives
rise to a huge amount of losses and errors on Bobs side, but it is however
interesting to evaluate the amount of information that Eve obtains in this
case, i.e. considering only the measurements where she gets a positive answer.
The probability of making the correct identification is given by eq.( 6) and
is equal to 12 +
1
2
√
N
. Whereas the probability of wrong identification, i.e. of
an error is given by eq.( 7) and is equal to 1(N−1)(
1
2 − 12√N ). This means that
the (Shannon) information obtained by Eve is given by [10]
INint,Eve = log2(N) +
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
N
)
log2
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
N
)
+
(
1
2
− 1
2
√
N
)
log2
(
1
(N − 1)
(
1
2
− 1
2
√
N
))
(10)
on the ’1’ outcomes of her measurements.
In the next section we will compare this amount of information to the
amount of information obtained performing optimal eavesdropping at the
point where the information lines between Bob and Eve cross.
4 The optimal cloning machine
The optimal eavesdropping strategy in any dimension, is believed to be given
by a asymmetric version of the quantum cloning machine [11] which clones
optimally the two mutually unbiased bases [4]. Using this cloner, Eve can ob-
tain two copies of different fidelity of the state prepared by Alice. Usually Eve
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keeps the bad copy and sends the good one on to Bob. For a full description
of how this eavesdropping strategy and of the cloning machine involved, see
[4]. Here we are only concerned with the final state that Bob receives, which
means how the optimal eavesdropping strategy influence the state obtained
by Bob. In the case of no eavesdropping Bob receives the same pure state as
was send by Alice. But in the case of eavesdropping Bob receives a mixed
state.
Assume that without eavesdropping Bob would have found the state | an 〉
if measuring in the computational basis. The question is what happens to
| an 〉 as a result of the eavesdropping? Or in other words, how does the
cloning machine influence the state | an 〉? We are only interested in the final
mixed state Bob receives, and that may be written as
ρB = FB | an 〉〈 an |+ DB
N − 1
N−1∑
j=0, j 6=n
| aj 〉〈 aj | (11)
where FB is the fidelity and DB = 1 − FB is the total disturbance. A sim-
ilar expressing can be obtained for the A′ basis states. As a result of the
eavesdropping the amount of information that Bob gets is
INopt,bob = log2(N) + FB log2(FB) + (1− FB) log2
(
1− FB
N − 1
)
(12)
The optimal eavesdropping strategy is symmetric under the exchange of
Bob and Eve. This means that the mixed state, ρE , which Eve obtains can be
written on the same form as Bob’s mixed state, just with different coefficients,
i.e.
ρE = FE | an 〉〈 an |+ DE
N − 1
N−1∑
j=0, j 6=n
| aj 〉〈 aj | (13)
And equivalently the amount of information obtained by Eve is given by
INopt,eve = log2(N) + FE log2(FE) + (1− FE) log2
(
1− FE
N − 1
)
(14)
It is interesting and important to consider the point where the informa-
tion lines between Bob and Eve cross. Since when Alice and Bob share more
information that Alice and Eve, Alice and Bob can use one-way privacy am-
plification to obtain a secret key. Using the explicit form and coefficients
of the cloning machine it is possible to show (this was done in [4]) that the
information curves cross at the point where
FB = FE = F =
1
2
+
1
2
√
N
(15)
DB = DE = D =
1
2
− 1
2
√
N
(16)
This is exactly the same fidelity (or probability of guessing correctly the state)
that Eve obtained using the intercept/resend eavesdropping using the inter-
mediate states. Which means that we have just shown that
INInt,eve = I
N
opt,eve(crossing point) (17)
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This is explained by the fact that, at the crossing point of the information
lines, Eve’s mixed state can be decomposed into a mixture of some of the
intermediate states, namely
ρcrossE =
1
N
N−1∑
j=0
|mnj 〉〈mnj | (18)
where again it has been assumed that | an 〉 was the correct state. The same
result holds for Bob, since at the crossing point Bob and Eve posses the same
mixed state.
The mixture of the intermediate states may be interpreted as if Eve with
probability 1/N has the state |mnj 〉 (there are N possible values of j). Eve,
naturally, waits and performs her measurement after Alice has revealed in
which basis the quNit was originally prepared. Then she measures her quNit
in the same basis, which means that she uses either the basis A or A′.
Which means that the situation is the following: For the optimal eaves-
dropping strategy, Eve posses one of the intermediate states and she measures
in one of the corresponding basis A or A′. Whereas in the intercept/resent
eavesdropping with the intermediate states, the situation is exactly the oppo-
site namely, Eve has one of the basis states from A or A′ and she measures
the intermediate states. The two situations obviously lead to the same prob-
abilities and hence the same amount of information.
5 The Bell inequality in arbitrary dimen-
sion
Recently there has been a big interest in generalizing various type of Bell in-
equalities [12], [13]-[18] in higher dimension. The Bell inequality we present
here [19] makes use of the intermediate states, in a way similar to the CHSH
inequality. This means that first we present the measurements and the quan-
tum limit and only afterwards the local variable bound. So at first we just
write down a particular sum of joint probabilities.
5.1 The Bell inequality: The quantum mechanical
limit
Suppose that Alice and Bob share many maximally entangled state of two
quNits. In the computational basis this state may be written as
|ψ 〉 = 1√
N
N−1∑
i=0
| ai, ai 〉 (19)
For each of her quNits Alice has the choice of two measurements, namely
to measure the basis A or the basis A′. Whereas Bob for each of his quNits
has the choice between N2 binary measurements, corresponding to all the
intermediate states of the two bases used by Alice.
In order to write down the Bell inequality, it is convenient to assign values
to the various states. In the table below is shown the values:
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value A A′ M0 M1 · · · MN−1
0 | a0 〉 | a0′ 〉 |m00 〉 |m01 〉 · · · |m0,N−1 〉
1 | a1 〉 | a1′ 〉 |m11 〉 |m12 〉 · · · |m10 〉
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
N − 1 | aN−1 〉 | aN−1′ 〉 |mN−1,N−1 〉 |mN−1,0 〉 · · · |mN−1,N−2 〉
Notice that intermediate states have been organized into N sets so that the
value of the state is always given by the first index. Moreover this organi-
zation into the sets M0, . . . ,MN−1, simplifies the notation in what follows.
However, it is important to remember that the states in each of the sets are
not orthogonal, in other words they do not form N orthogonal bases.
The inequality is a sum of joint probabilities. And it is obtained by sum-
ming all the probabilities for when the results of the measurements are cor-
related and from this sum subtract all the probabilities when the results are
not correlated, i.e.
BN =
∑
p(results correlated)
−
∑
p(results not correlated)
Suppose that Alice measures in the A basis and Bob measures the pro-
jectors in the set M0. For this combination of measurements, there are the
following contributions to the sum BN :
P (M0 = A) =
N−1∑
i=0
p(mii
⋂
ai) =
1
2
+
1
2
√
N
(20)
P (M0 6= A) =
N−1∑
i,j=0,j 6=i
p(mii
⋂
aj) =
1
2
− 1
2
√
N
(21)
Where P (M0 = A) should be read as follows: Bob measures one of the pro-
jectors in M0 and Alice measures A, and Bob obtains the value which is
correlated with Alice’s result. On the other hand P (M0 6= A) means that
Bob’s result is not correlated with the result obtained by Alice. The proba-
bility p(mkl
⋂
an) = p(mkl|an)p(an) is the joint probability for obtaining both
| an 〉 and |mkl 〉.
The same is the case if Bob measures the projectors in any of the other sets
M1, . . . ,MN−1 and Alice always measures in A. And again if Bob uses M0
and Alice A′. Which means we have P (Mi = A) = P (M0 = A′) = 12 +
1
2
√
N
and P (Mi 6= A) = P (M0 6= A′) = 12 − 12√N .
Now consider the case where Bob uses M1 and Alice A
′, in this case Bob
consistently finds a value which is N−1 higher than the value which correlates
him with Alice. To see this, assume for example that Bob has the state | a′0 〉
which is assigned the value 0. But the state in M1 which gives the correct
identification of this state is |mN−1,0 〉, but this state has been assigned the
value N−1. Similar for all the other states, which leads to P (M1 = A′+(N−
1)) = 12+
1
2
√
N
and P (M1 6= A′+(N−1)) = 12− 12√N . Actually, when ever Alice
measures A′ and Bob uses any of theMi, Bob consistently finds a value which
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is N− i higher than the one which correlates him with Alice. This means that
P (Mi = A
′ + (N − i)) = 12 + 12√N and P (Mi 6= A
′ + (N − i)) = 12 − 12√N .
It is now possible to write and evaluate the sum BN
BN =
N−1∑
i=0
P (Mi = A)−
N−1∑
i=0
P (Mi 6= A)
+
N−1∑
i=0
P (Mi = A
′ + (N − i)) −
N−1∑
i=0
P (Mi 6= A′ + (N − i))
= 2N
((
1
2
+
1
2
√
N
)
−
(
1
2
− 1
2
√
N
))
= 2
√
N (22)
The quantity BN is a sum of 2N × N2 terms if written out explicitly. In
the next section we show that a local variable model which tries to attribute
definite values to the observables will reach a maximum value of 2. This shows
that we have obtained a Bell inequality where the quantum violation grows
with the squareroot of N .
5.2 The Bell inequality: the local variable limit
On Alice’s side a0, . . . , aN−1 are measured simultaneously in a single mea-
surement as the basis A, which means that only one of them can come out
true in a local variable model. The same is the case for a′0, . . . , a′N−1 which is
measured as the basis A′. This means that, for example, if ai is true, meaning
that the measurement of A will result in the outcome ai, then all probabilities
involving aj with j 6= i must be zero. It is different on Bob’s side where each
mkl is measured independently and hence they may all be true at the same
time in a local variable model.
Assume now that according to some local variable model ai and a
′
j are
true. At the same time, in principle, all the mkl could be true too. But
notice now that the only m-state which will give a positive contribution to
the quantity BN is the one which identifies both ai and a
′
j correctly, i.e. mij.
This will give rise to a contribution of +2. Whereas mil and mkj where only
one index is correct, will only identify of the states correctly and the other
one wrong. This means that these states, since this gives rise to one correct
and one wrong identification, will result in a zero contribution. And finally
the states mkl where both indices are wrong will only give rise to errors and
will hence give a negative contribution of −2 to the sum BN . Which means
that
BN ≤ 2 (23)
However, we have already shown that quantum mechanically it is possible
to violate this limit. Quantum mechanically the limit is 2
√
N . This means
that we have obtained a Bell inequality where the violation increases with the
squareroot of the dimension.
For N=3, the inequality has been checked in various ways numerically.
First of all it has been checked that 2
√
3 is indeed the quantum mechanical
limit to this sum of probabilities and that this maximum is reached for the
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maximally entangled state. Moreover, it has been checked using ”polytope
software” [13, 20] that the inequality eq.(23) is optimal for the measurement
settings which we have presented here.
6 Bell parameter as a function of ρB
In this section we investigate how the Bell violation decreases as a function of
the disturbance introduced by the eavesdropper. It is not necessary to think
of it in terms of quantum cryptography and eavesdropping, but simply that
the quantum channel from Alice to Bob is noisy and that the noise which is
introduced is identical to the noise an eavesdropper using the optimal cloning
machine would introduce.
Assume, without loss of generality, that without disturbance, Bob would
have received the state | a0 〉, then we know that the mixed state that he
obtains as a function of the disturbance can be written eq.(11)
ρB = FB | a0 〉〈 a0 |+ DB
N − 1
N−1∑
i=1
| ai 〉〈 ai |
In order to compute S(ρB) it is enough to consider the case where Bob for
example use the states in M0 for his measurements, the rest of the terms in
the inequality follows by symmetry.
All the states in the M0 set are of the form |mjj 〉. First computing the
various probabilities 〈mjj |ρB |mjj 〉, we find
〈mjj |ρB |mjj 〉 = FB
p(mjj |a0)︷ ︸︸ ︷
〈mjj | a0 〉〈 a0 |mjj 〉
+
DB
N − 1
N−1∑
i=1
〈mjj | ai 〉〈 ai |mjj 〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
p(mjj |ai)
(24)
There are two different cases which have to be checked independently, namely
j = 0 and j 6= 0: For j = 0 we have
〈m00 |ρB |m00 〉 = FBF + (N − 1) DB
N − 1
D
N − 1 (25)
and for j 6= 0 we have
〈mjj |ρB |mjj 〉j 6=0 = FB
D
N − 1 + F
DB
N − 1 + (N − 2)
DB
N − 1
D
N − 1 (26)
Where we have used that p(m00|a0) = F and p(mjj|a0)j 6=0 = DN−1 , see eq.(6)
and eq.(7).
In the inequality 〈m00 |ρB |m00 〉 appears with a plus sign, since this is the
probability of correctly identifying the state. At the same time 〈mjj |ρB |mjj 〉j 6=0
appears N−1 times with a minus sign in the inequality, since these correspond
to all the possible errors. This means that we can define
s(ρ) = 〈m00 |ρB |m00 〉 − (N − 1)〈mjj |ρB |mjj 〉j 6=0
= FB(F −D)− FDB − N − 3
N − 1DDB (27)
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Figure 1: This figure shows as a function of the dimension, the disturbance at the
crossing point D (upper curve), and the disturbance for which the Bell violation
stops DS=2 (lower curve)
There are 2N2 terms equal to s(ρB) in the Bell inequality, since there are N
2
intermediate states and each of them appear twice (once for each basis A and
A′). On the other hand in each basis A and A′ each state appears with a
probability 1/N , this mean that the total Bell parameter is equal to
S(ρB) = 2Ns(ρB) = 2N
(
FB(F −D)− FDB − N − 3
N − 1DDB
)
(28)
It is now possible to answer a very interesting question, namely for which
disturbance is S(ρB) = 2. Using the values of F eq.(6) and D eq.(7) and
expressing FB = 1−DB , one find that S(ρB) = 2 for
DS=2B =
N
3
2 −√N −N + 1
N
3
2 +N2 − 2N
(29)
This can be compared to the disturbance D at the crossing point between the
information lines, this is shown in figure 1. We find that it is only for N = 2
that DS=2B = D, and hence only in two dimension that the inequality we have
presented here can be used as a security measure in quantum cryptography.
However, it should be stressed that the violation of the inequality stops before
the crossing point is reached. So a violation of the inequality, in any dimension,
still means that Alice and Bob are within the secure zone.
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7 Interesting features of the B3 inequality
In this section we restrict ourself to three dimension in order to show in a
simple way some interesting properties of the inequality.
7.1 Complex versus real numbers
The first is related to the use of complex numbers. In the CHSH inequality for
qubits, the maximal violation may be obtained by using real numbers only.
Also the CGLMP inequality [18] show no difference between real and complex
numbers. Here we show that if restricted to real numbers it is not possible to
obtain maximal violation for the inequality we have presented.
Numerically we have found the settings which leads to the largest violation
when restricted to real numbers. On Alice’s side the first basis is again the
computational basis A, whereas the second basis Ar (r stands for real) is found
by making a pi/3 rotation around the (1, 1, 1) axis in ℜ3 and is explicitly given
by
| ar0 〉 =
1
3
(2| a0 〉+ 2| a1 〉 − 1| a0 〉)
| ar1 〉 =
1
3
(−1| a0 〉+ 2| a1 〉+ 2| a0 〉) (30)
| ar2 〉 =
1
3
(2| a0 〉 − 1| a1 〉+ 2| a0 〉)
The intermediate states are defined in the same way, and the three sets M0,
M1 and M2 again consists of nonorthogonal states. We find the following
probabilities:
P (M0 = A) = 5/6 , P (M0 6= A) = 1/6
P (M1 = A) = 4/6 , P (M1 6= A) = 2/6
P (M2 = A) = 5/6 , P (M2 6= A) = 1/6
P (M0 = A
r) = 5/6 , P (M0 6= Ar) = 1/6
P (M1 = A
r + 2) = 4/6 , P (M1 6= Ar + 2) = 2/6
P (M2 = A
r + 1) = 5/6 , P (M2 6= Ar + 1) = 1/6
Alice and Bob are still assumed to share the maximally entangled state |ψ 〉.
Inserting these probabilities in the B3 inequality leads to B3 = 10/3 ≈ 3.333,
which is smaller than the maximal violation which is 2
√
3 ≈ 3.464.
The explanation for this difference can be found in the fact that the in-
equality BN has been optimized for mutually unbiased bases. In two dimen-
sion it is possible to have two such bases, for example the z and the x−basis
are mutually unbiased and both real. But when going to higher dimension it
is not the case, for example in three dimension it is not possible to have two
mutually unbiased bases and have them both real. Which means that in order
to reach the maximum value, for the inequality we have presented here, it is
necessary to introduce complex numbers. Whereas the CGLMP inequality
for qutrits has not been optimized for mutually unbiased bases, this explains
why it does not require complex numbers.
12
7.2 Binary measurements versus basis measurements
The BN inequality is on Bob’s side optimized for the N
2 binary measurements
corresponding to the intermediate states of the two bases chosen by Alice.
However it is possible to impose the additional requirement that not only
must the measurements chosen by Bob maximize the probabilities, but they
must also form basis. In other words it is possible to require that the M -sets
correspond to orthogonal bases M b (b refers to basis). We have considered
this question in three dimensions.
The M b-basis which provide the optimal solution are defined in the fol-
lowing way: For the two mutually unbiased bases chosen by Alice there exist
unitary operators Ui such that
U | ai 〉 = | a′i 〉 , U = A′ ·A−1 (31)
In this way the intermediate basis is defined as
|mbii 〉 =
√
U | ai 〉 , Mi =
√
UA (32)
Since U is unitary
√
U is well defined. It is possible to construct all three
basis M b0 , M
b
1 and M
b
2 in this way, choosing the unitary operator such that it
transform the states in A into any of the states in A′. This definition leads to
the following probabilities
P (M b0 = A) = 7/9 , P (M
b
0 6= A) = 2/9
P (M b1 = A) = 7/9 , P (M
b
1 6= A) = 2/9
P (M b2 = A) = 7/9 , P (M
b
2 6= A) = 2/9
P (M b0 = A
′) = 7/9 , P (M b0 6= A′) = 2/9
P (M b1 = A
′ + 2) = 7/9 , P (M b1 6= A′ + 2) = 2/9
P (M b2 = A
′ + 1) = 7/9 , P (M b2 6= A′ + 1) = 2/9
These probabilities may again be used in the B3 inequality. But it is im-
portant to realize that evenif the notation for the inequality is the same, the
interpretation is different. Since the states in the M bi -sets are orthogonal and
M bi are bases, Bob no longer chooses between 9 different binary measurements
but between three basis measurements. However, it is possible to check that
the local variable limit is not changed, i.e. it is still 2. Inserting the above
probabilities leads to Bb3 = 6(7/9 − 2/9) = 10/3 ≈ 3.333.
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However, using basis measurements on Bob’s side leads to some other
interesting results. It turns out that it is possible to reduce the number of
terms in the inequality. The B3 inequality is the sum of all correct guesses,
subtracting all the errors. Using the intermediate bases M bi it is possible to
subtract only half of the errors and in this way obtain a different inequality
with a different local variable limit, namely S12 ≤ 3,
S12 = P (M
b
0 = A) + P (M
b
1 = A) + P (M
b
2 = A)
+ P (M b0 = A
′) + P (M b1 = A
′ + 2) + P (M b2 = A
′ + 1)
− P (M b0 = A+ 1)− P (M b1 = A+ 1)− P (M b2 = A+ 1)
− P (M b0 = A′ + 2)− P (M b1 = A′ + 1)− P (M b2 = A′)
≤ 3 (33)
Inserting the above probabilities leads to the quantum mechanical maximum
for this inequality namely, S12 = 6(7/9 − 1/9) = 4.
8 Resistance to noise
In the recent papers on Bell inequalities, the strength of the inequality has
been measured in terms of its resistance to noise [16, 17, 18]. The question is
how much noise can be added to the maximally entangled state, |ψ 〉, and still
obtain the Bell violation. The more noise which can be added to the system
the better, since this means that the inequality is robust against noise.
What is meant by noise naturally has to be specified. In the previous
section we, for example, considered the noise which is introduced by an eaves-
dropper when she uses the optimally eavesdropping strategy. However, the
noise which was until recently used in the measure of the strength of an in-
equality was uncolored noise. This means that the maximally entangled state
is mixed with the maximally mixed state, so that the quantum state becomes
ρmix = λmix|ψ 〉〈ψ |+ (1− λmix) 1
N2
(34)
This can be interpreted as if Bob with probability λmix receives the maximally
entangled state and with probability 1−λmix he receives the maximally mixed
state. For the maximally entangled state the Bell inequality, BN (23) has
maximal violation, i.e. S = 2
√
N . Whereas for the maximally mixed state
each of the probabilities in the inequality is equal to 1/N , hence S(1 /N2) =
2(2−N). This leads to
S(ρmix) = 2 ⇐⇒ λBNmix =
N − 1
N +
√
N − 2 (35)
ForN = 3, this is λB3mix =
2
1+
√
3
≃ 0.73. In comparison, the CGLMP inequality
is more robust to this kind of noise, since they find a violation until λCGLMPmix ≃
0.69.
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Recently it has been argued that the use of uncolored noise in this measure
lead to problems [21, 22]. At the same time a different kind of noise was
introduced, namely to mix the maximally entangled state with the closest
separable state, i.e.
ρcs = λsep|ψ 〉〈ψ |+ (1− λsep)ρsep (36)
where ρsep =
1
N
∑N−1
i=0 | ai, ai 〉〈 ai, ai | [23]. Examining what happens to the
Bell violation when introducing the state ρsep in BN eq.(23), shows that when
Alice measures in the A basis, Alice and Bob remain perfectly correlated
- which means maximal violation of that part of the inequality concerning
measurement combinations involving A. Whereas when Alice measures in the
A′ basis Bob is left with the maximally mixed state, which means that all the
joint probabilities involving using A′ on Alice’s side are equal to 1/N . In total
this leads to
S(ρcs) = 2 ⇐⇒ λBNsep =
N −√N
N +
√
N − 2 (37)
which forN = 3 is λB3sep =
3−√3
1+
√
3
≃ 0.46. Whereas the CGLMP inequality again
has λCGLMPsep ≃ 0.69. Which means that the inequality we have introduced
here is much more robust to this kind of noise.
It should be stressed that the same measurement settings have been used
in both evaluations of λ, and that the CGLMP inequality has been optimized
to be resistant to the uncolored noise. It is nevertheless interesting to see how
the robustness of the BN inequality change depending on the different noise
added to the system.
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9 Minimum detection efficiency
To conclude the study of the inequality (23), let us consider the minimum
detection efficiency required to violate it. This question is interesting both
from a fundamental point of view (the so called detector efficiency loophole
[24]) and for the practical question: How to test a quantum device, like a
quantum cryptography system? [25, 7]. For simplicity we assume that all
detectors have the same efficiency η. The problem is what to do with the
cases that only one detector fires. A natural possibility attributes the value
zero to bob whenever his detector did not fire and a random value to Alice
whenever her detector did not fire. In this way, if only Alice detects a quNit,
the Bell function vanishes. Whereas, if only Bob detects, the Bell function is
the same as for the maximally mixed state, i.e. 2(2 − N) as in the previous
section. Thus the inequality reads:
η2 · 2√N + η(1 − η) · (0 + 2(2−N))
η2 + 2η(1 − η) ≤ 2 (38)
From this inequality one finds the threshold efficiency:
ηthreshold =
N
N +
√
N − 1 (39)
For qubits, i.e. N=2, one recovers the welknown threshold, usually derived
from the Clauser-Horn inequality [26]: η
(N=2)
threshold ≈ 82.8%. This threshold is
minimal and slightly better for N=4: η
(N=4)
threshold = 80%. For higher dimensions
the threshold increases and tends to 1.
It would be interesting to investigate the behavior of non-maximally entan-
gled states, since Eberhard found that for qubits the threshold then decreases
[28]. Let us mention that recentyly S. Massar proved that there are inequali-
ties for which the threshold tends to zero exponentially, at least for very large
dimensions [27] and, with colleagues he investigated situation similar to the
one studied in this section [29].
10 Conclusion
For qubits the intermediate states play fundamental roles in at least three dif-
ferent place: intercept/resend eavesdropping in the BB84 protocol for quan-
tum cryptography, optimal eavesdropping also in the BB84 protocol and in
the CHSH-inequality for two entangled qubits. The work we have presented
here, is the result of a study, of the use of these intermediate state in the same
situations but in arbitrary dimension.
In this paper we have first discussed the generalization of the intermediates
states of two mutually unbiased bases, showing that these states are in general
not orthogonal and hence do not form basis as in the case for qubits. We have
also discussed how they, nevertheless, can be use as binary measurements.
With these measurements we have considered the same situations as known
from the qubit case.
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We have considered eavesdropping in the generalized BB84 protocol (al-
ways considering only two bases). When the eavesdropper use the optimal
eavesdropping strategy, her information increase as a function of the distur-
bance that she introduce and at the same time Bob’s information is a decreas-
ing function of the disturbance. For a given disturbance their information lines
cross. We have shown that the amount of information that the eavesdropper
obtain at this crossing point, is exactly the same amount of information she
would have obtained using the simple intercept/resend strategy using the in-
termediate states. However leading to a much higher disturbance. This is
explained by the fact that in any dimension Eve’s mixed state can at the
crossing point be decomposed into a sum of some of the intermediate states.
Hence, in the optimal eavesdropping strategy, at the crossing point, Eve has
one of the intermediate state but perform her measurement in the same basis
as the state was originally prepared. Whereas in the intercept/resend strat-
egy using the intermediate states as binary measurements, Eve has the state
which was originally prepared by Alice, but measure one of the intermediate
states. This means that the two situations are exactly opposite, and therefore
lead to the same probabilities and hence the same information.
The maximal settings for the CHSH-inequality for qubits are two mutually
unbiased bases on Alice’s side and using the intermediate states on Bob’s side.
In the case of qubits the four intermediate states form two bases. This means
that in this case both Alice and Bob have the choice of measuring one of two
mutually unbiased bases.
In higher dimension where the intermediate states do not form bases, Bob
instead use the corresponding projectors as binary measurements. Which
means that he choose betweenN2 mutually incompatible measurements, whereas
Alice still choose between two basis measurements. The generalized inequality
we present has the local variable limit equal to 2 in any dimension whereas
the maximal quantum mechanical value is 2
√
N . In other words we find a
violation which increase with the squareroot of the dimension. Due to the
construction we also obtain the familiar CHSH-inequality for N = 2.
It is known that the CHSH inequality may be used as a security measure
in quantum cryptography for qubits. Since in this case a violation of the
inequality is obtained until the disturbance introduced by the eavesdropper,
reaches the disturbance at the crossing point of the information lines between
Eve and Bob. Until this point Alice and Bob can use the fact that they share
more mutual information than with Eve to obtain a secret key by means
of one way privacy amplification. We have investigated the violation of the
inequality we present here as a function for the disturbance introduced by the
eavesdropper. We found that it is only for N = 2 that the inequality can be
used as a security measure, in the sense that in higher dimension the violation
stops for a lower disturbance than the disturbance at the crossing point. This,
however, does not mean that such an inequality does not exist, it only shows
that the inequality which mimics the situation from two dimension is not the
one which has this property in higher dimension.
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On the other hand the inequality we have presented here may stand as a
result by itself and as a Bell inequality in arbitrary dimension is has many
nice properties. First of all, compared to the other inequalities which have
been presented recently, this inequality gives maximal violation for maximally
entangled states. This means this inequality may be used as a measure of en-
tanglements. Moreover we have shown in examples in three dimensions that
this inequality require complex numbers in order to have maximal violation.
Restriction to the use of real numbers lead to a smaller violation. In compar-
ison, the CHSH inequality for qubits and the CGLMP inequality for qutrits
show no difference between using real or complex numbers. The explanation
is due to the fact that the inequality we present here is optimized for mutually
unbiased bases and in three dimension it is not possible to have two such bases
without the use of complex numbers. Whereas in two dimension the x and
z− bases are mutually unbiased and both real, and for the CGLMP inequality
the explanation is that it is not optimized of mutually unbiased bases.
We have also shown that imposing the additional constrain that the M -
sets actually form bases, leads to new inequalities. We have explicitly given
an example in three dimensions, showing the optimal solution, for two basis
measurements on Alice’s side and three basis measurements on Bob’s side.
The strength of a Bell inequality has been measured in terms of its re-
sistance to noise. Until recently the noise was taken to be uncolored noise,
which means that the maximally entangled state is mixed with the maximally
mixed state. The inequality we present here is less resistant to this kind of
noise that other inequalities which have been presented recently. It should
however be mentioned that these inequalities have been optimized for this
kind of noise. However, recently it was argued that using the uncolored noise
leads to problems. At the same time a different kind of noise was introduced,
namely mixing the maximally entangled state with the closest separable state.
When using this measure we find that the inequality we present here, is much
more robust than, for example, the CGLMP-inequality.
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